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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of the minimum wage on wage inequality,
relative employment and over-education. We show that over-education can be
generated endogenously and that an increase in the minimum wage can raise
both total and low-skill employment, and produce a fall in inequality. Evidence
from the US suggests that these theoretical results are empirically relevant. The
over-education rate has been increasing and our regression analysis suggests
that the decrease in the minimum wage may have led to a deterioration of the
employment and relative wage of low-skill workers.
JEL classification: J31, J41, J42
Key words: Minimum wage, earnings inequality, monopsony, efficiency wage,
over-education.
∗Early versions of this paper have been presented at the University of Massachusetts, University
of Aarhus, Higher School of Economics, and Queen Mary University of London. We thank seminar
participants for helpful comments. Perceptive comments and suggestions by an anonymous referee
have been particularly helpful.
†International College of Economics and Finance, Higher School of Economics, Moscow; email:
fslonimczyk@hse.ru
‡University of Massachusetts, Amherst; email: pskott@econs.umass.edu
1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the effects of changes in the minimum wage on wage inequality,
relative employment and the prevalence of mismatch (over-education) in the labor
market.
Studies by DiNardo et al. (1995) and Lee (1999) have suggested that changes in
the minimum wage and other labor market institutions have been important for the
observed increase in inequality. This claim has obvious appeal. It is easy to see
how these institutional changes may have put downward pressure on low-skill wages.
However, in a standard model the change in relative wages will raise the demand for
low-skill workers. Contrary to this prediction, low-skill workers appear to have lost
ground in terms of both wages and employment.
The simultaneous increase in the relative wage and employment of high-skill work-
ers has been interpreted as evidence of skill-biased technical change (e.g. Levy and
Murnane, 1992; Acemoglu, 2002). Other interpretations are possible, however: in this
paper we show that a fall in the minimum wage can generate a deterioration in the
position of low-skill workers, both in terms of wages and employment. The presence of
mismatch is central to the argument. As shown by Sattinger (2006) and Skott (2005,
2006), relative wages and employment can move in the same direction, even in the
absence of any skill bias, if the prevalence of mismatch is determined endogenously.
Induced changes in mismatch, moreover, can contribute to an explanation of changes
in within-group or residual inequality.
To keep matters as simple as possible, we assume that high-skill workers can
get two types of jobs (‘good’ high-tech jobs and ‘bad’ low-tech jobs), whereas low-
skill workers have only one type of employment opportunity (low-tech). We show
that mismatch —some high-skill workers having low-tech jobs— is compatible with
a variety of labor market theories, including extended versions of standard efficiency
wage models in which the monitoring of workers’ effort is imperfect, contracts are
incomplete, and workers cannot convincingly pre-commit to not shirking. In this
setting, one solution is for firms to use the threat of dismissal as a way to elicit effort
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Bowles, 1985). For this threat to work, both good and bad
jobs must be rationed to ensure that employed workers receive a rent over and above
their best alternative. Good jobs pay more than bad jobs, which in turn must pay more
than unemployment. In equilibrium there will be both un- and under-employment
(some high-skill workers have bad jobs that do not utilize their skills), and inequality
between groups will depend not only on the wage gap between good and bad jobs, but
also on the degree of mismatch. As long as some matches of high-skill workers and bad
jobs are sustained in equilibrium, changes in exogenous variables will affect not only
wages and employment rates but also the degree of mismatch. These induced changes
in the degree of underemployment of high-skill workers lie behind the monopsonistic
effects. An increase in the minimum wage can reduce the employment of high-skill
workers in low-tech jobs, and this deterioration of the employment conditions for
high-skill workers relaxes the no-shirking condition in high-tech jobs and stimulates
employment.
Monopsonistic effects have been introduced into efficiency wage models by Reb-
itzer and Taylor (1995) but our mechanism is different. Rebitzer and Taylor assume
that firms have fixed monitoring resources, so that the probability of detecting a shirk-
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ing worker is decreasing in the total number of employees. Thus, firms are forced to
increase wages, and thereby the potential penalty of dismissal, pari-passu with em-
ployment. In other words, firms face an upward sloping labor (effort) supply curve,
and a binding minimum wage may induce an increase in employment, just as in the
classical monopsony case. Unlike Rebitzer and Taylor, we have two different types of
workers, and this heterogeneity, in combination with the presence of mismatch, im-
plies that monopsonistic features can arise even with exogenously given probabilities
of detection.1 In our setting, unemployment, mismatch and monopsonistic effects are
generated by the same efficiency-wage mechanism.2
The monopsonistic effects provide a link to another strand of literature. The
monopsony model, literally interpreted, may have little relevance (for example see
Stigler, 1946) but as argued by Manning (2003, 2004), labor markets can be monop-
sonistic, even if there is a multiplicity of buyers of labor. Indeed, the survey by Boal
and Ransom (1997) describes several alternative multi-agent models that lead to many
of the same conclusions as classic single-buyer monopsony. We contribute to this liter-
ature by showing that efficiency wages can generate economy-wide monopsony effects
as well as skill mismatch.
The significance of the theoretical analysis depends on the degree of mismatch.
While measuring mismatch has proved challenging, studies suggest that over-education
is widespread in all OECD countries. Estimates range between 10 and 40%, and the
evidence also shows large differences in the returns to education to different workers,
depending on whether they are over- or under-qualified for their jobs (Sicherman,
1991; Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2000)3. Combining data from the Dictio-
nary of Occupational Titles and the Current Population Survey, our own estimates
in this paper produce over-education rates of about 15-25% in the US, and the rate
of over-education changes substantially between 1973 and 2002 (the period for which
we have data).
Our theoretical model generates predictions for the effect of the minimum wage on
unemployment, over-education, relative wages and relative employment. We estimate
the relevant reduced-form equations using time series variation for the US as a whole
and supplement these regressions with panel regressions using state-level data. This
approach is unlike most recent empirical work on the employment effects of the min-
imum wage, which looks at specific groups or industries that are likely to be strongly
affected, such as teenagers and restaurants (see Card and Krueger (1995), Dube et al.
(2010), and Brown (1999) and Neumark and Wascher (2006) for surveys). Our the-
oretical argument, however, concerns macro effects on the entire labor market, and
these macro effects can not be captured by a partial study of employment effects for
a small subset of workers or industries. Nothing in our argument precludes adverse
1The model can be extended to include fixed monitoring resources, as in Rebitzer and Taylor. An
appendix with this extension is available on request.
2This is unlike the analysis in Manning (2003, pp. 256–262), where efficiency wage elements and
involuntary unemployment are added to models with monopsonistic features.
3Some studies have suggested that individual ability bias explains these results. Slonimczyk
(2008), however, shows that differences in the returns to surplus and required qualifications persist
when fixed effects are introduced. Slonimczyk (forthcoming) studies the effect of increasing skill
mismatch on earnings inequality in the U.S.
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employment effects in some industries or for some groups of workers.4 The argument
for positive employment effects in this paper is not that the individual employer has
monopsonistic power and therefore increases employment and output in response to
a rise in the minimum wage. Nor do we rely on inelastic demand for the output of
sectors with a high proportion of low-skill workers.
The regression results are consistent with monopsonistic effects of changes in the
minimum wage. The coefficient on minimum wages is either negative and significant
or statistically not different from zero in all time series and panel regressions for low-
skill and high-skill unemployment. We also find a strong inverse relationship between
the minimum wage and the degree of over-education. Finally, the regressions give the
expected negative effect of the minimum wage on the wage premium in high-skill jobs.
One obvious shortcoming of aggregate time series data is the small number of
observations, in our case 96 quarterly observations over the period 1979–2002. The
construction of a relevant minimum wage also raises problems since some state level
minimum wages exceed the Federal minimum.5 Panel data improves matters in some
respects. The number of observations increases, the minimum wage can be defined at
the state level, and the non-binding Federal level in some states —which is a problem
in time series regressions— now becomes an advantage. But endogeneity issues, in
particular with respect to the relative labor supply, lead to other problems.6 These
limitations and problems imply that the results should be interpreted with care.
The paper is in five sections. Section 2 describes the theoretical argument for en-
dogenous mismatch. The effects of changes in a binding minimum wage are examined
in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Endogenous mismatch
2.1 A benchmark without mismatch
Consider an economy with two types of jobs and two types of workers. Jobs are either
high-tech or low-tech. Workers can be high-skill or low-skill; the level of skill is the
product of past decisions to invest in human capital and is taken as given.
Firms maximize profits subject to a production function,
Y = F (NH , NL) (1)
where NH and NL are the total number of high- and low-tech jobs that have been
filled. There are constant returns to scale.
4The model in section 3 suggests that an increase in minimum wages may lead to expansion
of employment of low-skill adult workers (their no-shirking condition has been relaxed), but the
expansion may happen at the expense of both teenage workers and mismatched high-skill workers.
This outcome would be in line with Neumark and Wascher’s (2006) finding that an expansion of the
earned income tax credits generate a displacement of teenage women by low-skill adult women.
5Changes in the coverage of the minimum wage could also be a potential source of difficulties.
However, coverage was stable over the period that we consider.
6Changes in the minimum wage could also be partly endogenous (Card and Krueger, 1995; Autor
et al., 2008). We address this issue in section 4.5.
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Assuming perfect competition, the first order conditions with respect to the em-
ployment levels yield:
wH = F1(NH , NL) (2)
wL = F2(NH , NL) (3)
where wH and wL denote the real wage rates in high and low tech jobs and Fi is the
partial derivative with respect to argument i. The perfect-competition assumption
could be relaxed. Imperfect competition with a constant markup on labor cost can be
covered by including the same multiplicative constant on the right hand side of both
(2) and (3); this would leave the qualitative results unchanged.
The first order conditions (2)–(3) can be combined with supply equations for the
two types of labor. Let H and L be the numbers of low- and high-skill workers in
the total labor force. If low- and high-skill workers are matched to low- and high-tech
jobs, respectively, standard supply equations can be written as
NsH
H
= GH(wH); G
H′ ≥ 0 (4)
NsL
L
= GL(wL); G
L′ ≥ 0 (5)
In equilibrium NH = N
s
H and NL = N
s
L, and equations (2)–(5) determine solutions
for the wages and employment.
2.2 A model with mismatch
It may be reasonable to assume that only trained doctors are hired by hospitals
to do surgery, but one can wait tables, even with a Ph.D. degree. This possibility of
mismatch between a worker’s skill and the skill requirements of the job can be captured
by allowing both types of workers to compete for the low-tech positions; we assume
that high-tech jobs, by contrast, must be filled by high-skill workers. Algebraically,
NH = NHH (6)
NL = NLL +NHL (7)
where NH and NL denote high- and low tech jobs and Nij is the employment of
workers of type i in a jobs of type j (i = H,L; j = H,L).
Assuming, for simplicity that high- and low-skill workers are perfect substitutes in
low-tech jobs, the production function (1) and the first-order conditions (2)–(3) will
be unaffected by the mismatch. The supply equations (4)–(5), however, are replaced
by the following wage equations:
wHH = φ
HH
(
NHH
H
,
NHL
H
,wL
)
; φHH1 > 0, φ
HH
2 ≥ 0, φHH3 ≥ 0 (8)
wHL = φ
HL
(
NHH
H
,
NHL
H
,wH
)
; φHL1 > 0, φ
HL
2 ≥ 0, φHL3 ≥ 0 (9)
wLL = φ
LL
(
NLL
L
,wH
)
; φLL1 > 0, φ
LL
2 ≥ 0 (10)
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Equation (8) gives the real wage in high-tech jobs as a function of the employment
rate for high-skill workers in high- and low-tech jobs (NHH/H and NHL/H) and the
wage rate for mismatched high-skill workers (wL). Analogously, the wage equation for
high-skill workers in low-tech jobs uses the employment rates and the wage rate for
well-matched high-skill workers (wH) as its arguments. Low-skill workers never get
high-tech jobs and their wage equation (equation (10)) therefore contains only two
arguments, their employment rate and the wage rate in high-tech jobs. Equations
(8)–(10) are compatible with a range of labor market theories. A special case based
on the Shapiro-Stiglitz model of efficiency wages is presented in detail in section 2.3.
Wage bargaining models or norm-based theories of wage formation could also fit the
equations, however: the bargaining power of workers in high-tech jobs, for instance,
will depend on the arguments of the φHH -function, and wage norms typically take
into account both the state of the labor the labor market and the wages received by
other groups (e.g. Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Skott, 2005). Standard Walrasian supply
equations, finally, are special cases of (8)–(10).7
Equations (8)–(10) define three distinct wage rates. However, at an interior solu-
tion with both high- and low-skill workers in low-tech jobs, we must have
wHL = wLL = wL (11)
If equation (11) did not hold, profit maximizing firms would not hire both types of
workers.8 Trivially,
wH = wHH (12)
since only high-skill workers have high-tech jobs.
Equations (6)–(12) can be combined with the first-order conditions (2)–(3) to solve
for the levels of employment (NH , NHL, NLL) and wages (wH , wL). The existence of
interior solutions with mismatch depends on the precise specification of the equations.9
We illustrate this possibility of interior solutions using the Shapiro-Stiglitz model.10
7If high- and low-tech jobs are equally attractive in all non-wage respects, standard supply func-
tions can be written
wHH = wHL = φ˜
HH
(
NHH +NHL
H
)
wLL = φ˜
LL
(
NLL
L
)
where φ˜HH and φ˜LL correspond to the inverses of the supply functions in equations (4)–(5), (GH)−1
and (GL)−1.
8For simplicity we have assumed that high- and low-skill workers can be substituted one-for-one.
Differential productivity can be incorporated by defining the total employment in low-tech jobs as
NL = NHL+λNLL where λ represents the relative productivity of low-skill workers. This extension
implies that wHL = λwLL. All other results are unaffected.
9The benchmark in section 2.1 with wH > wL, which can be obtained as a special case (cf.
footnote 7), has no interior solutions.
10The Shapiro-Stiglitz model was chosen partly because of its ‘orthodox’ character: using this
model shows that fairness norms or other non-standard elements are not required to generate the
results. Many of the assumptions of the model are clearly unrealistic but for present purposes we
want stay as close as possible to the original formulation.
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2.3 An extended Shapiro-Stiglitz model
Following Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), an employed worker of type i in a job of type
j gets a wage wij and instantaneous utility
uij =
{
wij − eij if not shirking
wij if shirking
where eij is the worker’s disutility associated with exerting effort. Workers are risk
neutral and discount future outcomes at the rate ρ.
Firms set wages to ensure that workers’ best response is to exert effort. Monitoring
is costly, and shirkers are detected (and fired) according to a positive but finite hazard
rate (δ). The rate of job termination for non-shirking workers (p) is also positive and
finite. Discount and termination rates are assumed constant across worker types.
These assumptions define three no-shirking conditions:
ρVHH = wHH − eHH − p(VHH − VHU ) (13)
= wHH − (p+ δ)(VHH − VHU )
ρVHL = wHL − eHL − p(VHL − VHU ) + qHLH(VHH − VHL) (14)
= wHL − (p+ δ)(VHL − VHU ) + qHLH(VHH − VHL)
ρVLL = wLL − eLL − p(VLL − VLU ) (15)
= wLL − (p+ δ)(VLL − VLU )
where the Vij are the value functions associated with each of the three employment
states and qijk are transition rates for workers of type i in jobs of type j, and tran-
sitioning into job type k. Equations (13) through (15) incorporate the assumptions
that low-skill workers get only low-tech jobs and high-skill workers prefer high-tech
jobs (the transition rates qHHL and qLLH are zero). If the no-shirking conditions are
binding, equations (13)–(15) imply that
VHH − VHU = eHH
δ
(16)
VHL − VHU = eHL
δ
(17)
VLL − VLU = eLL
δ
(18)
Assuming the flow of instantaneous utility is zero when unemployed, the value
functions for unemployed workers are given by:
ρVHU = qHUH(VHH − VHU ) + qHUL(VHL − VHU ) (19)
ρVLU = qLUL(VLL − VLU ) (20)
Using equations (13)–(20) and assuming that the transition probabilities for a high-
skill worker into high-tech jobs are the same independently of whether the worker is
unemployed or under-employed (qHUH = qHLH = qHH), we can solve for wages:
6
wHH = eHL
δ + ρ+ p+ qHH + qHUL
δ
+ (21)
+(eHH − eHL)δ + ρ+ p+ qHH
δ
wHL = eHL
δ + ρ+ p+ qHH + qHUL
δ
(22)
wLL = eLL
δ + ρ+ p+ qLUL
δ
(23)
Given the termination rates for shirkers and non-shirkers and a constant supply
of both types of workers (H,L), all transition probabilities (q) can be determined
through steady state conditions that depend only on employment levels. In a steady
state, the unemployment rates and the rate of mismatch are constant, and entries and
exits from each of the employment states are balanced. Formally:
qHH(H −NH) = pNH (24)
qHUL(H −NH −NHL) = pNHL + qHHNHL (25)
qLUL(L−NLL) = pNLL (26)
Using (24)–(26), the wage equations (the no-shirking conditions) can be written
wHH = eHL
δ + ρ+ p HH−NH−NHL
δ
+(eHH − eHL)
δ + ρ+ p HH−NH
δ
(27)
wHL = eHL
δ + ρ+ p HH−NH−NHL
δ
(28)
wLL = eLL
δ + ρ+ p LL−NLL
δ
(29)
The no-shirking conditions (27)–(29) fit the general wage equations (8)–(10). Us-
ing (11)–(12), it is readily seen that the two groups of workers will have the same
unemployment rates (uH =
H−NH−NHL
H =
L−NLL
L = uL) if eHL = eLL. Empirically,
unemployment rates for low-skill workers are higher than for high-skill workers, and
we assume eLL > eHL. The same equations show that the two unemployment rates
must move together. From the wage equations it follows, finally, that high-tech jobs
pay a higher wage than low-tech jobs if eHH > eHL;
11 we assume this condition is
met.
As shown by Skott (2006), this model can generate seemingly paradoxical effects.
Neutral shifts in the production function may affect the relative wage and the relative
11A similar result could be obtained with equal levels of effort disutility but different detection
rates of shirkers (δHL > δHH).
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employment rate of high-skill workers in the same direction and, moreover, because
it hurts the employment prospects of low-skill workers, an increase in the supply of
high-skill labor can lead to an increase in the skill premium.
3 Minimum wages
Now introduce a binding constraint on the low-tech wage. The constraint could come
directly from a minimum wage that is set above the equilibrium solution for wL, or the
constraint could be interpreted more broadly. The general wage equations in section
2.2 may reflect norms of fairness that evolve over time. Some changes in the norms
may be autonomous —broad ideological shifts may lead to increased tolerance of wage
inequality and employer ‘greed’. Others may be triggered by particular events. Thus,
the minimum wage is likely to be an important reference point for wages at the low
end of the spectrum. Its rise may give firms an incentive to adjust wages, even for
low-paid workers with wages above the minimum wage, in order to avoid adverse
effects on morale, productivity and labor turnover. In short, only a relatively small
proportion of the labor force is directly affected by the minimum wage but a much
broader group may be affected indirectly.
Although in what follows we shall refer to the binding constraint simply as the
minimum wage, the broader interpretation should be kept in mind. Our low-tech jobs
should be seen as an aggregate of different low paying jobs with wages that move
together and are influenced by the minimum wage.
3.1 General effects
We are interested in the effects of an increase in the minimum wage (w) on employment
and wages. With constant returns to scale, an increase in one of the real wage rates
must be associated with a decline in the other wage.12 By assumption the minimum
wage is binding for low-tech jobs, and an increase in the minimum wage must therefore
reduce the wage in high-tech jobs.
wL = w (30)
wH = ζ(w); ζ
′ ≤ 0 (31)
Using the first-order conditions (2)–(3), the resulting decline in the wage ratio wH/wL
generates an increase in the employment ratio NH/NL:
NH = η(w)NL = η(w)(NLL +NHL); η
′ ≥ 0 (32)
The general conclusions summarized by equations (31)–(32) are based on the pro-
duction function and firms’ first order conditions (2)–(3); they are independent of the
12Assume that both wages at the new equilibrium were greater than or equal to the wages at
the original equilibrium (with at least one strict inequality). In this case real unit labor costs must
have increased which contradicts the assumption of a constant markup on labor costs (under perfect
competition the markup is unity and the argument can be phrased differently: if firms satisfy the
zero-profit constraint at the new equilibrium, they would have been able to make positive profits at
the initial configuration of wage rates, and the initial position could not have been an equilibrium).
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wage equations. Additional results, however, require assumptions about the nature
and extent of mismatch in the labor market.
3.2 Minimum wages and induced mismatch
Without mismatch, a decline in wH implies a fall in NH (see equation (4)). Since the
employment ratioNH/NL rises, low-skill employment must also fall.
13 This conclusion
holds whenever the relevant ‘supply curve’ for high-skill labor is upward sloping and
independent of the minimum wage.
Things become more complicated when there is mismatch. In the Shapiro-Stiglitz
model, if the minimum wage is binding then, by definition, the no-shirking condition
cannot be binding for both high- and low-skill workers in low-tech jobs. It may be
binding for one or the other, but the minimum wage only has bite if firms could fill
a larger number of low-tech jobs with non-shirking workers at an unchanged wage.14
We consider two polar cases. In the first case, the no-shirking condition is always
binding for low-skill workers; in the second case it is always binding for high-skill
workers.
In his study of wage setting behavior, Bewley (1999) found that overqualified job
applicants were common but that many employers were reluctant to hire them. In-
deed, this “shunning of overqualified job applicants”is highlighted as one of two novel
findings of the study (p.18). Attitudes to overqualified applicants differed somewhat
between primary and secondary sector jobs, where secondary sector jobs are defined
as short-term positions that are often part time. Both sectors received applications
from overqualified workers, but 70 percent of firms expressed a “total unwillingness”to
hire them for primary sector jobs, 10 percent were “partially unwilling”and only 19
percent were “ready to hire”overqualified applicants (pp. 282–83). Two main rea-
sons account for the negative attitude to overqualifications: a concern that applicants
would quit again as soon as possible and a concern that applicants would be unhappy
on the job. Secondary sector employers had fewer reservations, but only a minority
(47 percent) “were ready to hire them”with 30 percent being “totally unwilling”and
23 percent “partially unwilling”(p. 324).
Bewley’s findings support our first case: they suggest that firms may prefer low-
skill workers in low-tech jobs if both high- and low-skill workers are available at the
same wage cost. Bu¨chel (2002), however, suggests that “over-educated workers are
generally more productive than others”and that, because of this, “firms hire over-
educated workers in large numbers.”This claim would seem to support our second
case.
3.2.1 Case 1: Mismatch with low-skill workers preferred in low-tech jobs
When firms prefer low-skill workers in low-tech jobs, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model implies
that high-skill workers will only be hired for low-tech jobs if the no-shirking condition
13A completely inelastic supply curve for high-skill labor means that high-skill employment is
unaffected by an increase in the minimum wage; low-skill employment still falls.
14The argument also applies to the general wage equations (9)–(10). If the minimum wage is
binding, the wage equations for high- and low-skill workers in low-tech jobs cannot both be satisfied.
One of the groups must be rationed.
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is binding for low-skill workers.15 Thus, the no-shirking condition for low-skill workers
is satisfied as an equality while the minimum wage exceeds the expression for wHL in
(28).
Since the no-shirking condition for high-skill workers in low-tech jobs fails to be
satisfied as an equality, equation (17) no longer holds. Instead —using (13), (14), and
(19)— we have
VHL − VHU = w − eHL
ρ+ p+ qHH + qHUL
=
w − eHL
ρ+ p HH−NH−NHL
(33)
and the no-shirking conditions for high-skill workers in high-tech jobs and low-skill
workers can be written,
wH =
δ(w − eHL)
ρ+ p HH−NH−NHL
δ + ρ+ p HH−NH−NHL
δ
+
+(eHH − δ(w − eHL)
ρ+ p HH−NH−NHL
)
δ + ρ+ p HH−NH
δ
(34)
w = wL = eLL
δ + ρ+ p LL−NLL
δ
(35)
Equation (35) shows that NLL will increase following a rise in the minimum wage,
that is, low-skill workers will benefit both in terms of wages and employment. This
important result is quite intuitive. By assumption the no-shirking condition represents
the binding constraint on low-skill employment, and an increase in the minimum wage
relaxes this constraint. A higher minimum wage may also affect the number of low-
tech jobs but that has no effect on low-skill employment as long as some low-tech jobs
are filled with high-skill workers.
The solution for NH and NHL is not quite as simple. The high-tech wage and
the ratio of high-tech to low-tech jobs are determined, as before, by the first order
conditions (2)–(3), and the values of NH and NHL can be derived using (34) and the
definitional relation
NH =
NH
NL
(NHL +NLL) (36)
The effect of a rise in w on NH is ambiguous. There may be a negative effect
on the number of high-skill jobs, not surprisingly, but a positive effect on NH can be
obtained if NLL is elastic and an increase in wL generates a large decrease in NHL.
An increase in NH is a necessary condition for other interesting effects. The
employment ratio NH/NL must rise, but with an increase in NH this condition can
be satisfied, even with an increase in NL. An increase in both NL and NH , moreover,
implies that aggregate employment must also increase. These monopsonistic effects
are made possible because a rise in minimum wages relaxes the no-shirking constraint
15Appendix A outlines the effects of minimum wages using the more general wage equations in
section 2.1.
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Table 1: Employment and wage effects of changes in the minimum wage when firms
prefer low-skill workers in low-tech jobs
w NLL NHL NL NH wH Ω N
wHA
w Θ
1.7 0.03 0.58 0.62 0.29 3.68 0.64 0.9 1.38 0.40
1.8 0.30 0.35 0.67 0.35 3.47 0.37 1.02 1.45 0.32
1.9 0.45 0.23 0.67 0.39 3.29 0.21 1.06 1.46 0.24
2.0 0.54 0.11 0.66 0.42 3.13 0.10 1.08 1.44 0.16
2.1 0.61 0.02 0.63 0.45 2.98 0.02 1.08 1.40 0.06
Note: Authors’ simulation based on the following parameter values: L = H = 1,
eLL = 1.3, eHL = 0.5, eHH = 2, Y = 5N
0.5
H N
0.5
L , ρ = 0.1, δ = 1, p = 0.2.
for low-skill workers, and as the employment of high-skill workers in low-tech jobs
decreases, there is a derived effect on the no-shirking condition for high-skill workers
in high-tech jobs.
The monopsonistic outcome is illustrated by the numerical example in Table 1.
The production function is taken to be Cobb-Douglas and the parameters of the utility
function are chosen to ensure that wH > wL. Given the parameters and initial values,
an increase in the minimum wage raises NLL, NH and N ; low-tech employment NL
first rises and then drops back to roughly its initial level. The displacement of high-
skill workers from low-tech jobs is also shown in Table 1: the increase in w reduces
the degree of over-education (Ω). The average wage premium is increasing in wH/wL
but decreasing in Ω, and the net effect is a non-monotonic relation with the minimum
wage, increasing for some values of the minimum wage but falling if the minimum
wage is raised beyond a certain point. An increase in w, finally, reduces within group
inequality (Θ).16
3.2.2 Case 2: Mismatch when firms prefer high-skill workers in low-tech
jobs
In this case firms only hire low-skill workers if the no-shirking condition is binding for
high-skill workers in low-tech jobs. Algebraically, the wage rates satisfy the following
equations:
16These variables are defined as follows:
Ω =
NHL
NH +NL
wHA
wL
=
NHL
NH+NHL
wL +
NH
NH+NHL
wH
wL
Θ =
√
NHL
NH +NHL
(
wL − wHA
wHA
)2 +
NH
NH +NHL
(
wH − wHA
wHA
)2
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Table 2: Employment and wage effects of changes in the minimum wage when firms
prefer high-skill workers in low-tech jobs
w NLL NHL NL NH wH Ω N
wHA
w Θ
1.61 0.86 0.39 1.25 0.52 3.88 0.22 1.77 1.81 0.39
1.64 0.50 0.48 0.99 0.42 3.81 0.34 1.41 1.62 0.41
1.67 0.03 0.62 0.65 0.29 3.74 0.66 0.94 1.40 0.41
Note: Authors’ simulation based on the following parameter values: L = H = 1,
eLL = 0.2, eHL = 0.5, eHH = 2, Y = 5N
0.5
H N
0.5
L , ρ = 0.1, δ = 1, p = 0.2.
wH = eHL
δ + ρ+ p HH−NH−NHL
δ
+ (eHH − eHL)
δ + ρ+ p HH−NH
δ
(37)
w = wHL = eHL
δ + ρ+ p HH−NH−NHL
δ
(38)
From profit maximization we know that an increase in w leads to a decline in
wH and an increase in NH/NL. Equations (37)–(38) now imply that NH must fall
(substitute (38) into (37) and use the fact that wH −w decreases) and hence that NL
declines.
These implications are qualitatively the same as in the case without mismatch.
The presence of mismatch, however, adds a few extra results. Using (38), it follows
that a rise of w will increase aggregate employment of high-skill workers (NH +NHL).
Hence, the decline in low-skill employment (NLL = NL − NHL) is exacerbated, the
proportion of mismatched high-skill workers (NHL/(NH + NHL) and the degree of
over-education (Ω) go up, and the wage premium, wHA/w will fall. Total employment
(N = NH +NL) must decrease since NH/NL increases and NH falls.
According to this case, the fall in minimum wages since the 1970s should have
led to increases in high-tech wages and the wage premium; the number of high-tech
jobs should also have increased but over-education should have dropped, as should
total employment of high-skill workers and within-group inequality; low skill workers
should have seen an increase in employment. Numerical results are given in Table 2.17
4 Evidence
In this section we look at how the theoretical predictions of the model hold up against
the available evidence. We first introduce the data and provide a descriptive analysis
of the main trends in employment and earnings. This is followed by the estimation of
reduced form equations derived from the model.
17With one exception, the benchmark parameters are the same as in Table 1. The exception is the
cost of effort for low-skill workers which has been changed to eLL = 0.2 (compared to eLL = 1.3 in
Table 1). The value of eLL does not affect the solution for low-skill employment, but a lower value of
eLL is used to ensure that the no-shirking constraint is satisfied for low-skill workers at the implied
levels of NLL and wL = w.
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4.1 Measuring mismatch and match premia
The empirical relevance of the analysis in the previous section depends on the extent
of mismatch in the labor market. It is notoriously difficult to measure skill require-
ments but the best existing source for the U.S. is the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles (DOT). The DOT reports expert assessment of more than 12, 000 job titles.
We take the General Education Development (GED) index as our measure of skill
requirements. The GED ranks jobs in a scale of 1 to 6 (a GED of 4 roughly represents
the skills acquired through high-school). Jobs with GED greater than 4 are considered
high-tech.
Unfortunately, the very detailed job classification of the DOT is not available in
any representative survey of earnings. We use the average GED over 3-digit occupa-
tions as a proxy measure.18 The analysis is thus restricted to the period 1973–2002,
during which the 1970 and 1980 census occupational classifications were in use. Dur-
ing this period there were two data issues of the DOT: 1977 and 1991. Other years
are obtained through linear extrapolation.
The skill requirements data were merged with the Current Population Survey
(CPS) earnings files. We use the education item to identify low- (high school or
less) and high-skill workers (at least some college). Figure 1 shows the distribution
of employment across job and skill levels over the period. The graph confirms the
well studied movement toward higher levels of education attainment. The share of
employed workers with at least some college went from around 33% in 1973 to over
58% in 2002. Less well known is the steady increase in the share of high skill workers
whose jobs have requirements below their skill level, at least according to the DOT
experts. At the beginning of the period only 14.7% of workers were in this category;
toward the end of the period the percentage of over-educated workers had increased
by 10 percentage points.
There are two potential objections to the finding of substantial and growing skill
mismatch in the U.S. economy. First, education attainment could be a poor measure
of skill supply if there have been significant changes in the quality of education and
some SAT scores show a slightly declining trend. The SAT scores, however, have a
downward bias because of the significant increase in the participation rate in these
tests (Grissmer, 2000). The more representative NAEP scores show minor fluctuations
but no sustained decline since the 1970s in the performance of high-school students
(Stedman, 2009).19
Second, the DOT-GED index might not be a reliable measure of skill requirements.
Table B.2 in the appendix summarizes information on skill requirements for the top
25 3-digit occupations in 2002. The information in the table provides an idea of the
evolution of the GED and two other DOT-based indexes during the period when the
1980 occupational classification was in use. Both the “Direction, Control, Planning”
(DCP) and the “Set Limits, Tolerances, or Standards” (STS) are consistent with the
GED in showing little or no change in skill requirements between 1983 and 2002.
It could be the case, however, that all DOT-based measures are biased. The last
18The GED scores and other DOT measures are generously made publicly available by David
Autor.
19Handel (2003) relates the evidence to the debate on skill requirements and mismatch.
13
comprehensive revision of the DOT scores was prepared for the third edition (1977).
The 4th edition (1991) relied heavily on the third edition scores and surveyed workers
in a small number of high tech sectors. For this reason, we collected descriptions of
education requirements from the ‘Training, Other Qualifications, and Advancement’
section in the 1983 and 2002 editions of the Occupational Outlook Handbook (U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1982, 2002). Almost without exceptions, these descriptions
confirm the finding of stable educational requirements (see table B.2).20
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Note: Source is CPS May−ORG. High−skill is some college and above. High−tech is GED>4.
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Figure 1: Distribution of the Employed Labor Force
Do job types matter for earnings, conditional on education attainment? To answer
this question we construct a wage sample from the CPS files. In 1973–78 earnings
questions were asked to the whole CPS sample in May.21 Our earnings variable is real
weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours, unless a separate and higher hourly
rate is also reported. Earnings are deflated using the CPI (1979 = 100). The wage
sample contains all wage and salary workers employed full time who are between 18
and 65 years of age. We weight the CPS data by hours worked and the appropriate
sampling weight. The CPS has undergone several changes that reduce its consistency
over time; details on the necessary adjustments on earnings and other variables are
provided in appendix B.
Figure 2 shows average real wages for workers separated into the same four groups.
Wages of high skill workers in high-tech jobs clearly stand out as higher than those
20Our findings are consistent with other assessments. Drawing on data from the Quality of Employ-
ment Survey, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the Survey of Workplace Skill, Technology,
and Management Practices (STAMP), Handel (2010, p.22) concludes that “there is little support for
the idea that skill upgrading has proceeded at an especially rapid pace in recent years.” See Handel
(2008) for details on the STAMP data and methodology.
21Starting in 1979, earnings questions are asked every month to roughly a fourth of the sample
(the outgoing rotation groups). One important implication is that, in order to exploit quarterly
variation in the minimum wage, the regression analysis is restricted to the period 1979-2002. A
previous version of this paper used yearly frequencies for the whole 1973–2002 period and obtained
qualitatively identical results.
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Figure 2: Average Earnings of Full-time Workers
of all other groups. Low skill workers in the low-tech sector are at the bottom of the
earnings distribution.22
4.2 Unemployment and mismatch
The analysis in section 3 generates reduced-form equations of the form
uL = f(w,
H
L
) (39)
uH = g(w,
H
L
) (40)
Ω = h(w,
H
L
) (41)
This general representation covers both cases 1 and 2, but the precise form of the
equations depends on whether firms prefer high- or low-skill workers in low-tech jobs.
The expression for uL, for instance, simplifies to uL = f(w) in case 1 (firms prefer
low-skill workers in low-tech jobs) and the expression for uH to uH = g(w) in case 2
(firms prefer high-skill workers in low-tech jobs).
Our regressions use log-linear versions of these equations but also include a time
trend to allow for the effects of technical change:
22The stylized model in section 3 has only two job categories and two skill levels, and this and
other simplifying assumptions imply that NLH = 0 and wHL = wLL. These strong predictions will
not hold if the simplifying assumptions are relaxed. With a range of jobs and skills, for instance,
college educated workers with low-tech jobs may hold jobs that are, on average, better than the
average job of correctly matched low-skill workers; analogously, undereducated low-skill workers get
high-tech jobs but the distribution of these jobs may not be the same as the distribution of the jobs
held by correctly matched high-skill workers.
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uL = γ0 + γ1t+ γ2 logw + γ3 log
H
L
(42)
uH = δ0 + δ1t+ δ2 logw + δ3 log
H
L
(43)
Ω = ρ0 + ρ1t+ ρ2 logw + ρ3 log
H
L
(44)
It is not possible to identify the structural parameters of the model from these
reduced forms, but the model implies the following parameter restrictions in cases 1
and 2:23
• Case 1: γ2 < 0, γ3 = 0, δ2 R 0, δ3 R 0, ρ2 < 0, ρ3 > 0; 24
• Case 2: γ2 > 0, γ3 < 0, δ2 < 0, δ3 = 0, ρ2 > 0, ρ3 = 0.25
We estimate these equations using quarterly data for the period 1979–2002.26 One
possible strategy is to estimate equations (42)–(44) using time series variation for the
whole sample. This approach has the advantage of being closest in spirit to the
macro model in section 3. The obvious drawback is that it leaves us with only 96
observations. Also, states have the ability —which they often use— to set a minimum
wage that is above the federally mandated. Therefore, it is difficult to construct a
good measure of the minimum wage at the national level. An alternative strategy is
to treat each state as a separate economy. This approach yields a balanced panel of
51 units, dramatically increasing degrees of freedom. It also allows for each state to
have its own minimum wage. However, the U.S. labor market is known to be highly
mobile and interconnected, and conditions that allow identification at the national
level might not hold for states. In particular, our specifications treat the relative
share of skilled workers (H/L) as exogenous. This assumption is more likely to hold
at the national level since workers already in the work force find it costly to adjust
their skill levels and adjustment through new entries is slow. It is harder to make
the same case at the state level. Workers can commute or move to the states offering
the best prospects for employment and wages. If H/L is endogenous, the reduced
form specification should drop this variable. We offer this alternative specification as
a robustness check in our tables below.
Tables 3–5 report the estimates of the reduced form regressions (42)–(44). Columns
(1)–(2) in Tables 3–4 and (1)–(3) in Table 5 contain time series estimates while
columns (3)–(5) in Tables 3–4 and (4)–(8) in Table 5 contain panel regressions us-
ing state level data. We estimated the time series regressions using both OLS and
23These restrictions do not depend on the specifics of the Shapiro-Stiglitz model. They hold
for the general framework in section 2.2. For example, the case 1 restrictions follow directly from
equations (52) and (54) in appendix A.
24The ambiguity of the sign of δ2 in case 1 was discussed in section 3. The sign of δ3 is ambiguous
for related reasons. An increase in H/L reduces NH/H but raises NHL/H, and the unemployment
rate can go either way. The analytics are messy, but simulations confirm the result.
25These parameter signs follow from equations (27)–(28).
26Table B.1 in the appendix provides descriptive statistics on the variables used in the analysis.
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GLS-AR(1), since for both unemployment rates the Durbin-Watson test-statistic re-
jects the null of no first order autocorrelation in the error term at the 5% significance
level. For the over-education rate the same test falls in the inconclusive region. The
equation for over-education was estimated with and without a cyclical correction (the
deviation of unemployment from its trend). Reassuringly, all these different variations
in the precise specification had only minor effects on the coefficient estimates.
Looking first at the time series results, we find no evidence that a rise in the
minimum wage will be associated with increased unemployment (for low-skill workers
the estimate is negative and insignificant). We also find evidence that an increase
in the minimum wage reduces over-education. These results are consistent with case
1, where firms prefer to hire low-skill workers in low-tech jobs. Case 2, by contrast,
implies a positive effect of the minimum wage on both low-skill unemployment and
the degree of over-education.
An increase in H/L produces a positive effect on skill mismatch, while the es-
timates for high- and low-skill unemployment are not statistically significant. This
again contradicts the implications of case 2. The predictions of case 1, by contrast, are
consistent with the findings for the degree of over-education (positive effect predicted)
and unemployment (zero effect on uL, indeterminate effect on uH).
We now discuss the panel results. We used both fixed and random effects estima-
tors. The Hausman test rejected the consistency of the random effects estimator in
all cases and we report only the fixed effects results.
The panel regressions differ from the time series results in some respects. The
coefficients on the minimum wage are negative and are now statistically significant
in all three equations. The estimates are also generally larger in absolute value. For
example, using estimates from column (4) in table 3, a one percent increase in the
state-level minimum wage is predicted to reduce high-skill unemployment by 0.011
percent points, other factors kept constant. It would be unrealistic to assume that
the set of included controls is sufficient to give these estimates a causal interpreta-
tion.27 However, the regression results suggest that the monopsonistic features of
the class of models presented in section 2 may be empirically relevant.28 Moreover,
to our knowledge no previous studies have suggested a negative relationship between
the over-education rate and the minimum wage. According to our findings, such a
relationship has both theoretical and empirical support.
The coefficient on the composition of the labor supply (H/L) remains positive and
significant for the over-education rate. The estimates for the unemployment rates are
now negative but very small in absolute value and statistically insignificant in the case
of low-skill unemployment. The sign reversal compared to the time series regressions
may be indicative of one of the main weaknesses of using the panel data approach.
Arguably, it may be reasonable to take the composition of the labor force as exogenous
for the US economy as a whole, but the exogeneity assumption becomes questionable
at the state level. The composition of the labor force therefore becomes endogenous,
and endogeneity bias may affect all the estimated coefficients.
The panel estimates were robust to a range of specifications. We ran the regressions
27We further discuss the possible endogeneity issues in section 4.5 below.
28The recent literature finds either no effect or slightly positive effects of the minimum wage on
employment (see, among others, Allegretto et al., 2011; Addison et al., 2009).
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with and without a separate time trend for each state and while the state-specific
trends improve the fit, the changes in the estimated coefficients are small. We also
experimented with specifications that included a full set of year dummies (available
upon request). The problem with this specification is that the minimum wage effects
can be identified only from the small number of observations where state minimum
wages exceed the federal minimum (Burkhauser et al., 2000). Not surprisingly, these
specifications showed insignificant (while still negative) effects of the minimum wage
on both unemployment rates. The coefficient estimate in the over-education rate
regression was still negative and significant.
Overall, the results of both the time series and panel regressions reject the case-2
predictions and are largely consistent with case 1.
Table 3: Reduced Form Regression for High-skill Unemployment: 1979.1–2002.4
Time Series Regressions State Panel Regressions
OLS GLS-AR(1) FE FE+State Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time Trend -0.001* -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
lnw -0.004 0.009 -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.011***
[0.010] [0.011] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
ln HL 0.015 0.006 -0.007*** -0.005***
[0.022] [0.011] [0.002] [0.002]
Constant 0.064*** 0.034** 0.058*** 0.062*** 0.064***
[0.014] [0.017] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Obs 96 96 4,896 4,896 4,896
R-squared 0.342 0.606 0.150 0.187 0.186
DW 0.130 1.636
Notes: Dependent variable is the unemployment rate for high-skill workers (0–1 range).
Regression (2) assumes the error term follows an AR(1) process. All regressions include
quarter dummies. Panel regressions include 51 state fixed effects. Regressions (4)–(5)
include state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors in brackets. *** significant at
1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Table 4: Reduced Form Regression for Low-skill Unemployment: 1979.1–2002.4
Time Series Regressions State Panel Regressions
OLS GLS-AR(1) FE FE+State Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time Trend -0.003* -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
lnw -0.017 -0.015 -0.024*** -0.030*** -0.029***
[0.021] [0.022] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
ln HL 0.029 0.033 -0.012*** -0.004
[0.047] [0.022] [0.003] [0.003]
Constant 0.154*** 0.124*** 0.133*** 0.143*** 0.145***
[0.030] [0.035] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Obs 96 96 4,896 4,896 4,896
R-squared 0.412 0.774 0.187 0.247 0.247
DW 0.112 1.120
Notes: Dependent variable is the unemployment rate for low-skill workers (0–1 range).
Regression (2) assumes the error term follows an AR(1) process. All regressions include
quarter dummies. Panel regressions include 51 state fixed effects. Regressions (4)–(5)
include state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors in brackets. *** significant at
1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Table 5: Reduced Form Regression for Over-education Rate: 1979.1–2002.4
Time Series Regressions State Panel Regressions
OLS GLS-AR(1) FE FE+State Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Time Trend -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** 0.004***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
lnw -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.019***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
ln H
L
0.168*** 0.169*** 0.149*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.102*** 0.102***
[0.012] [0.011] [0.014] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
uL (HP-dev) 0.209*** 0.128* 0.094*** 0.092*** 0.080***
[0.057] [0.074] [0.014] [0.014] [0.016]
Constant 0.287*** 0.287*** 0.276*** 0.265*** 0.265*** 0.254*** 0.253*** 0.195***
[0.008] [0.007] [0.010] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
Obs 96 96 96 4,896 4,896 4,896 4,896 4,896
R-squared 0.956 0.962 0.913 0.614 0.617 0.649 0.652 0.508
DW 1.011 1.246 2.142
Notes: Dependent variable is the over-education rate (range 0–1). Regression (3) assumes the error term follows an AR(1)
process. All regressions include quarter dummies. Panel regressions include 51 state fixed effects. Regressions (6)–(8)
include state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors in brackets. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level;
* significant at 10% level.
4.3 The high-tech wage premium wH/wL
The wage premium in high-tech jobs will be affected by changes in the minimum
wage. Our simplified model in section 3 has only two job categories, low- and high-
tech. A direct application of the model implies that wL = w, and —assuming profit
maximization under constant returns to scale— an increase in the minimum wage
therefore leads to a decline in wH , that is, d log(wH/wL)/d logw < −1.With a range of
different jobs and different skills, however, a change in the minimum wage will generate
a cascade of changes in the wage distribution. One would still expect the average wage
for the subset of low-tech jobs to move in the same direction as the minimum wage,
and the elasticity d log(wH/wL)/d logw should be negative. Its value, however, will
depend on the distribution of skills and jobs and on the chosen delineation of the
subsets of high- and low-tech jobs.
We estimated a reduced form relation with the high-tech wage premium as the
dependent variable and the minimum wage, the composition of the labor supply and
a time trend as regressors:
log
wH,t
wL,t
= β0 + β1t+ β2 logw + β3 log
H
L
(45)
The results are in Table 6. Column 1 has the baseline time series specification.
Column 2 adds a cyclical correction (the deviation of the unemployment rate from
its trend) since the adjustment speeds of both wages and employment in response to
shocks may be different for high-and low-tech jobs. The DW statistic rejects the null
of no autocorrelation, so in Column 3 we offer GLS estimates that assume an AR(1)
process for the error term.
The three time series specifications yield similar results29. We get a negative
(although statistically insignificant in the GLS-AR(1) specification) coefficient on the
29We also estimated the same set of specifications on a composition-adjusted relative wage depen-
dent variable. These results are available upon request and very close to those of the unadjusted
variable.
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minimum wage, and the negative effect of an increase in the relative supply of high-
skill labor is also what one would expect. The positive time trend, finally, is consistent
with skill-biased technical change and/or power-biased technical change.30
The panel regressions in columns (4)–(7) differ in whether they include cyclical
corrections and state-specific time trends. The effects of these variations in specifica-
tion are very minor. We also estimated the same specification omitting the relative
supply variable (column (8) in the table). The minimum wage coefficient remains
negative and significant.
Table 6: Reduced Form for the Log Hi/Low-tech Wage Gap: 1979.1–2002.4
Time Series Regressions State Panel Regressions
OLS GLS-AR(1) FE FE+State Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Time Trend 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
lnw -0.040* -0.041* -0.024 -0.024** -0.024** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.028**
[0.021] [0.021] [0.036] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
ln H
L
-0.216*** -0.216*** -0.107* -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.035*** -0.035***
[0.045] [0.046] [0.056] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
uL (HP-dev) 0.072 0.128 -0.038 -0.039 -0.035
[0.234] [0.300] [0.052] [0.050] [0.050]
Constant 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.274*** 0.306*** 0.306*** 0.308*** 0.308*** 0.328***
[0.030] [0.030] [0.046] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011]
Obs 96 96 96 4,896 4,896 4,896 4,896 4,896
R-squared 0.871 0.872 0.710 0.153 0.153 0.229 0.229 0.226
DW 0.871 0.869 2.336
Notes: Dependent variable is ln
(
wH
wL
)
. Regression (3) assumes the error term follows an AR(1) process. All
regressions include quarter dummies. Panel regressions include 51 state fixed effects. Regressions (6)–(8) include
state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors in brackets. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5%
level; * significant at 10% level.
4.4 Spurious correlation?
The correlation between the minimum wage and wage inequality has been noted in
previous studies. It has also been suggested, however, that this correlation may be
spurious and that shifts in the demand for skills, rather than autonomous changes
in non-market factors, have been central to the movements in relative wages and
employment.
Is there any direct evidence of spurious correlation? Autor et al. (2008) point to
the existence of a time series correlation not just between the minimum wage and lower
tail inequality (the 50/10 ratio) but also between the minimum wage and upper tail
inequality (90/50). The latter correlation, they argue, is “unlikely to provide causal
estimates of minimum wage impacts” (p.311). Instead, this correlation suggests that
causal influence of minimum wages in these regressions should be discounted. We do
not find this conclusion persuasive.
Our model, first, implies that changes in the minimum wage has ripple effects on
over-education and wages throughout the wage distribution. We would expect the
30The case for skill-biased technological change has been challenged by, among others, (Howell,
1999; Card and DiNardo, 2002). Skott and Guy (2007) and Guy and Skott (2008) suggest that there
is stronger evidence for “power-biased” technological change and that, like skill bias, a power bias
can increase both wage and employment inequality. Power-biased technical change produces shifts
in the no-shirking conditions, and the positive trend could reflect both skill-biased and power-biased
technical change.
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effects to be stronger at the lower tail than at the upper tail of the distribution, but
there will be some effect at the upper tail too. In line with this expectation, the results
reported by Autor et al. (2008) show much stronger effects at the lower tail than at
the upper tail: the coefficients on the minimum wage are -.23 and -.10, respectively.
Had the coefficients been reversed —with the stronger effect on upper tail inequality—
then it could have been seen as evidence of spurious correlation, but it is not obvious
that a coefficient of -0.10 is too high to be plausible.
One should still be cautious about causal attribution, in particular if there are rea-
sons to suspect that changes in the minimum wage may be determined endogenously
by labor market conditions. It could be argued that the decline in the minimum wage
reflects the decrease in the demand for low-skill workers and that the slide in the real
value of the minimum wage was necessary to prevent rising low-skill unemployment.
Our model questions this premise: low-skill employment may suffer as a result of a
falling minimum wage.
Lastly, changes in the minimum wage are related to political pressures and general
ideological trends. These trends have generated a range of non-market changes, from
labor market legislation and declining unionization to changes in fairness norms and
the deregulation of the financial industry. The estimated effect of the minimum wage
may be capturing the influence of these other non-market factors. This potential
problem of interpretation, however, does not imply that non-market changes merely
reflect market fundamentals.
5 Conclusion
The theoretical model in this paper is highly stylized and clearly tells —at best— a
small part of the story behind increasing inequality. Several results, however, stand
out and may play a role in a more elaborate account of the observed changes.
We have shown that if firms prefer to fill low-tech jobs with low-skill workers rather
than with over-educated high-skill workers then ‘aggregate monopsonistic elements’
arise naturally in a model with mismatch. These monopsonistic elements imply that
a fall in the minimum wage can have adverse effects on aggregate employment as well
as on the degree of mismatch and the rate of underemployment of high-skill workers.
A fall in the minimum wage can produce a rise in both within and between group
inequality and low-skill workers may suffer a double blow of declining employment
and wages.
The evidence reported in section 4 suggest that these theoretical results may be
empirically relevant. There is strong evidence of mismatch in the labor market, and
the degree of mismatch has been increasing, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. More-
over, the monopsonistic implications of the theoretical model are supported by US
data for 1979–2002. Our regressions suggest that the fall in the minimum wage led
to a deterioration of the employment and relative wage of low-skill workers and an
increase in the underemployment of high-skill workers.
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A The Minimum Wage in a General Setting
Using the general setting in section 2.1, the introduction of a binding minimum wage
means that the wage equations (8)–(10) are replaced by the following equations:
wH = φ
HH
(
NHH
H
,
NHL
H
,wL
)
; φHH1 > 0, φ
HH
2 ≥ 0, φHH3 ≥ 0 (46)
wL = w (47)
wL = φ
LL
(
NLL
L
,wH
)
; φLL1 > 0, φ
LL
2 ≥ 0 (48)
In accordance with the Bewley argument, high-skill workers are rationed in low-tech
jobs, and their wage equation (9) has been dropped; the equation for the binding
minimum wage, equation (50), takes its place. The general form of the wage equations
for high-tech jobs and low-skill workers, by contrast, is unchanged.
Equations (49)–(51) —which incorporate the conditions wLL = wHL = wL and
wHH = wH— can be used to examine the effects of a rise in the minimum wage w.
Using (31) and (51), we have
NLL
L
= ψ(w); ψ′ > 0 (49)
Equation (52) shows that NLL will increase following a rise in the minimum wage,
that is, low-skill workers will benefit both in terms of wages and employment.
Substituting (31)–(32) and (52) into (49), we get the following reduced form equa-
tion:
ζ(w) = φHH
(
η(w)
[
L
H
ψ(w) +
NHL
H
]
,
NHL
H
,w
)
(50)
Using the implicit function theorem, this equation defines NHL as a decreasing
function of w :
NHL
H
= χ
(
w,
L
H
)
; χ1 < 0, χ2 < 0 (51)
From (32), (52) and (54) it follows that
∂NH
∂w
= H
∂(NH/H)
∂w
= η′(w)
[
Hχ
(
w,
L
H
)
+ Lψ(w)
]
+η(w)
[
Hχ1
(
w,
L
H
)
+ Lψ′(w)
]
(52)
The effects of a rise in the minimum wage on the number of low-tech jobs and total
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employment can now be written
∂NL
∂w
= H
∂NHL
∂w
+ L
∂NLL
∂w
= Hχ1
(
w,
L
H
)
+ Lψ′(w) (53)
∂N
∂w
=
∂NH
∂w
+
∂NL
∂w
= η′(w)
[
Hχ
(
w,
L
H
)
+ Lψ(w)
]
+
[1 + η(w)]
[
Hχ1
(
w,
L
H
)
+ Lψ′(w)
]
(54)
The effect of a rise in w on NH is ambiguous. Not surprisingly, it may be negative
but a positive effect can be obtained if NLL is elastic and an increase in the minimum
wage generates a large decrease in NHL.
It is readily seen that
∂NL
∂w
> 0⇒ ∂N
∂w
> 0⇒ ∂NH
∂w
> 0 (55)
Thus, an increase in NH is a necessary condition for expansionary effects on total
employment or – an even stronger result – on low-tech employment.
As a simple analytical example of strong monopsonistic results, let H = L = 1
(for simplicity), η′ = 0 (a Leontief production function), φHH3 = 0, φ
HH
1 = φ
HH
2 →
∞ (high-tech wages are independent of the minimum wage and highly sensitive to
movements in the aggregate high-skill employment rate (NH +NHL)/H. With these
assumptions, the expression for the change in low-tech jobs can be written
∂NL
∂w
=
1
1 + η(w)
ψ′(w) > 0 (56)
B Basic processing of May/ORG CPS and DOT
Data
Data on skill requirements comes from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles 4th
Edition (1977) and revised 4th Edition (1991). We use the dataset compiled by Levy
and Murnane (1992) that contains weighted averages of three GED scores (language,
reasoning, and math) by occupation and sex using both the 1970 and 1980 3-digit
occupational classifications. Only the highest GED is binding so we drop the other
two. Scores for years other than 1977/91 are linearly extrapolated. The 1970 and 1980
Census occupational classifications are available in the CPS only during the period
1973–2002. Thus, we use the May CPS for 1973–78 and the merged outgoing rotation
groups for 1979–2002. The general inclusion criteria are: age in the range 18–65, to
have worked in the past, and potential experience between 1 and 40 years.
Calculations that involve earnings are done using the standard earnings weight
multiplied by usual weekly hours. Our wage variable is the log of real hourly earning
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Table B.1: Descriptive Stats: 1979.1–2002.4
Variable Time Series State Panel
Mean sd Mean sd
uH 0.038 0.009 0.037 0.016
uL 0.082 0.020 0.079 0.034
Ω 0.366 0.047 0.371 0.081
ln (wH/wL) 0.415 0.041 0.378 0.094
ln (NH/NL) -0.434 0.139 -0.450 0.246
ln(w) 0.791 0.102 0.808 0.104
ln (H/L) 0.058 0.234 0.040 0.353
uL (HP dev) 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.019
Obs 96 4896
# of States 51
in 1979 dollars (deflated using the CPI-U-RS). Hourly earnings are weekly earnings
divided by usual weekly hours with the exception of cases in which a separate higher
hourly wage is reported. After 1994 individuals are allowed to answer that their
hours vary. We use a simple regression imputation approach to assign hours to those
individuals. No allocated earnings are utilized, however. During the period 1989–
93 the allocation flags fail to identify most imputed earnings. Following Lemieux
(2006), we use the unedited earnings variable to identify and drop unflagged allocated
earnings. Topcoded earnings are winsorized using a 1.4 factor.
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